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DUE PROCESS FOR SERVICEMEN-THE MILITARY JUSTICE
ACT OF 1968
FRANcIs T. McCoy*
Military establishments throughout history have had their own systems of criminal law, radically different from the civilian law in substance, in tribunals, in procedure, in origin, in aims, and in other respects.
The establishment and general observance of a system of criminal justice to include rights for the accused is one of the tests to be passed by
a society emerging from barbarism to civilization. But there is no requirement in this "test" that persons within the military establishment
accused of crimes be extended either the same rights as civilian members of the society or indeed any due process at all. The Roman Empire
is a prime example: its high degree of civilization in general and its
legal system in particular have been extolled for two thousand years,
but the soldiers of Rome's legions, when accused of violations of the
military laws, were tried summarily and punished brutally as a matter
of course.'
The imposition on servicemen of a stricter criminal law, with less due
process than enjoyed by civilian defendants, is not the result of mere
caprice or of any innate harshness on the part of senior military commanders. Rigid standards for the military, strictly enforced, are vital to
the safety, even the continued existence, of a civil society. Soldiers undetered by the realization that desertion and battlefield derelictions will
bring prompt and drastic punishment may not provide effective defense against foreign enemies. Civil governments, whether democratic
or not, are on unstable ground as long as cliques of military officers feel
safe in plotting coups. Finally, few worse fates can befall a society
than to be at the mercy of either hostile or "friendly" troops who are
not deterred from violence by the expectation of swift trial and prompt
punishment.
What is called for is the achievement of a fair and sensible dividing
line between the sphere of action of the necessarily strict and summary
system of criminal justice administered within the military establishment
and the sphere of action for the normal civil court system with its full
.A.B., MA., LL.B., University of Florida; Associate Professor of Law, College of
Law, University of Florida.
1. C. BRAND, ROMAN MILrrARY LAw 23, 63-82 (1968).
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panoply of due process. Within the military's sphere of action it is
desirable to designate areas of law in which defendants might receive
substantially, even fully, certain of the rights accorded in civilian courts,
while at the same time preserving the harsher deterrence-and-punishment oriented approach for appropriate situations.
Substantive military law traditionally dealt with offenses of a military
nature such as desertion, disobedience to lawful orders, sleeping on guard
duty, or failure to meet prescribed standards of dress. Throughout
American history such violations of a strictly military nature have been
tried exclusively within the military establishment, either by courtmartial with its system of review by commanding officers, or by commanders acting alone.Y The regular civilian court system, both state and
federal, has always had jurisdiction over servicemen who violated the
state or federal criminal law,3 and accords them the same due process
as it accords a civilian. This article, however, is not concerned with
servicemen tried in such civilian courts.
Civilian and military courts share concurrent jurisdiction over a wide
area of offenses. Prior to the Civil War the military authorities could
try servicemen for various offenses punishable by civilian courts provided the charges could be made to fit into an offense over which Congress had granted jurisdiction to the military. For example, in some
situations a murder, triable in the civilian courts, could be classified as
conduct "prejudicial to good order and discipline" and then be dealt
with by court-martial.4 During the Civil War the Federal Congress gave
concurrent jurisdiction over certain civilian-type crimes of violence
committed during wartime by military personnel to courts-martial;6
meanwhile the Confederate army's military justice system held even
wider jurisdiction, not only over strictly military offenses but over any
offense against the Confederate national law or against the law of the
state in which the offense was committed.6
The 1950 statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice7 subjects American military personnel in either war or peace to court-martial for a
wide range of civilian-type offenses which if committed within a state
or a United States territory would also be punishable by the civil au2. See generally W. Wrms-mo, MIuITARy LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920)
[hereinafter cited as WxNmmor].
3. Id. at 671; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513-14 (1878).
4.
5.
6.
7.

WINTHROP, supra note 2, at 667.
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Star. 731; WINTHROP, supra note 2, at 667.
W. ROBINSON, JusrTcE IN GREY 368 (1941).
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 US.C. § 801 (1950).
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thorities. The Military Justice Act of 19688 makes no change in this
provision. This provision of the 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice
is a continuation of pre-existing statutes which since 1916 had made
serious encroachments on what had previously been the exclusive jurisdiction of civilian courts over peacetime, non-military offenses committed within the United States.9 Two examples of offenses included
are rape and various categories of homicide.10 The June, 1969 landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in O'Callahan v.
Parker" has, however, in effect held unconstitutional any prosecution
by court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for any
peacetime offense cognizable by an American civilian court, having no
military significance, committed off post while neither the accused nor
the victims were performing any military function, which crime neither
involves the security of military posts or of military property or flounts
military authority.' 2
It has been manifestly unfair, in trying a civilian and a serviceman
for identical non-military offenses committed in the same state, to withhold from the serviceman the due process protections afforded to the
civilian. Unfair as this was in our all-volunteer military establishment
from the end of World War I to the start of World War II, it has been
unjustifiably discriminatory against the millions of servicemen who have
been called to service involuntarily since the implementation of the draft
8. Pub. L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968). With the exception of the immediately effective
amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 69 and Art. 73, the Act is
to become effective on 1 August 1969. Id. § 4. These amendments to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice have been codified in the Feb. 1969 supplement to title 10
U.S.C.A.
9. Article of War 93, 39 Star. 650 at 664 (1916), continued by Act of June 4, 1920, ch.
2, § 1, 41 Star. 805 continued again by Act of June 24, 1948, tit. II, § 236, 62 Star. 640.
This article of war covered the Army alone until 1947; in that year the Air Force
was separated from thc Army but continued using the Army's then current Articles
of War. An enabling statute, 62 Stat. 1014 (June 25, 1948), authorized such continued
use by the Air Force of the Army's Articles of War. Article 8 of the Articles for the
Government of the Navy, Rev. Star. 1875 § 1624 pages 276 and following, provided for
punishment by court-martial of various non-military offenses whenever and wherever
committed, including inter alia drunkenness, fraud, theft, "or any other scandalous con
duct tending to the destruction of good morals," dueling, onshore "plundering, abusing,
or maltreating any inhabitant or injuring his property in any way." All of these
provisions were retained, 34 U.S.C. § 1200 art. 8 (1946), but were finally replaced by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 34 U.S.C. S 1200 art. 8 (1946), (Supp. V, 1952)
(see page 2117).
10. Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 118 and 120, 10 U.S.C. §5 918, 920 (1964).
11. 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969).
12. Id. at 1685, 1691.
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law and the call-up of reserves in the pre-Pearl Harbor days of World
War IL For the volunteer who endangers his unit by getting drunk on
sentry duty 13 or hurls barracks-language insults at his company commander,' 4 military-style justice is appropriate; it is indeed surprising,
though, that military-style justice has been applied from 1940 to June,
5
1969 to the draftee who, off base, seduces a fifteen year old girl' or
attempts rape.:"
The O'Callahan'7 decision has gone a long way toward ending this
unequal and unfair treatment of military personnel, and further cases
augmented by executive initiative are to be expected which will continue
this long overdue start toward "equal justice under law" for military
personnel accused of offenses of no military significance. It is important
that the O'Callahan decision makes no distinction as to whether the
suspect is a volunteer, draftee, reservist, or prospective career man,
nor whether he is an enlisted man or an officer.
The hesitance of the courts and of the Department of Defense and
its precursors to extend constitutionally guaranteed rights-guaranteed
at least to civilians-to military defendants has long been a major factor
in the continuation of the double standard of due process, with one
standard for the general public and a harsher standard for military
personnel. Surprisingly, until the recent O'Callabandecision, the United
State Supreme Court gave no clear indication as to which, if any, of the
Constitution's enumerated civil rights applied directly and unequivocally
to military defendants. Even that far-reaching decision leaves many
unanswered constitutional questions.
The gap between due process for civilians and due process for military personnel has been greatly narrowed by statutes, court decisions,
and executive actions starting in 1950, and now the military defendant
enjoys most of the constitutionally guaranteed due process rights accorded to civilians. Notable exceptions are the right to indictment by
grand jury and trial by petty jury, the right to bail, and the right to
be confronted in non-capital cases with adverse witnesses.
In focusing on the Military Justice Act of 1968'8 this article deals
with various rights of American servicemen and with several areas of
13. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913 (1964).
14. Id. art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1964).
.15. Id. art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1964).
16. Id. art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1964). This was one of the offenses for which thedefendant had been convicted in O'Callahan.
17. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969).
18. Pub. L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968).
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due process. Few of the protections covered by the 1968 Act were officially recognized as rights of American servicemen prior to World
War II. Some of the protections had long been treated as customary
privileges to be granted on a discretionary basis and others were foreshadowed in an evolutionary progression by recognizable forerunners.
The establishment and expansion of these rights for servicemen has
been accomplished since the end of World War II. The Uniform Code
of Military Justice, enacted in 1950,'1 was a major revolutionary step
in providing due process in the military's "Court of General Criminal
Jurisdiction," the general court-martial, the only type of court-martial
empowered to adjudge the death penalty, dishonorable discharge or
dismissal, or imprisonment for over six months. Since 1950 many decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the lower federal courts,
and the United States Court of Military Appeals have amplified and
extended some of the rights granted by that Code to the military defendant and have also extended to such defendants certain rights which
have come into existence for the general population since 1950. The
Military Justice Act of 196820 has extended to defendants tried by the
strictly circumscribed special courts-martial most of the protections
formerly limited to defendants tried by general courts-martial, has taken
a major step toward providing judges who are both legally trained and
free from influence by the local military "brass" to preside over both
general and special courts-martial, and in general has raised the standard of due process within the military justice system.
THE RIGHT OF AN AccUSED TO A LAWYER AS DEFENSE COUNSEL

Since adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 195021 the
military justice system has been exemplary in providing lawyers to
those in need of trained defense counsel. This has been a drastic improvement over the system prevailing through World War II, under
which an accused was provided with free "defense counsel," but in
even the most serious cases this "defense counsel" could be an officer
without legal training.
The 1950 Code required that lawyers be assigned as defense counsel
in all cases before general courts-martial, the courts-martial of "general
jurisdiction" which have jurisdiction to adjudge any authorized sen19. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1950).
20. Pub. L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968).
21. 10 U.S.C. H 801-940 (1964).
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tence including the death penalty. 2 There is no test of indigence; all
persons tried by general court are entitled to a free assigned lawyer as
defense counsel. As long as a general court-martial is involved, the
basic 1950 Code guarantees a lawyer as defense counsel not only at
the trial itself 23 but befofe trial from the time charges are filed24 and,
in certain cases, following trial through the review and appellate system within the military establishment.2 5 There is no statutory requirement that the military furnish a free lawyer for petitioning civilian
federal courts for remedies such as habeas corpus. It is interesting that
thirteen years elapsed between the granting of the right to a free defense lawyer under the 1950 Code and the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright26 which gave a similar right to indigent
defendants accused of felonies within the civilian state court systems.
The United States Court of Military Appeals, which was established
under the 1950 Act, has broadened considerably the right to a free,
appointed lawyer as defense counsel. In a line of forward-thinking
decisions 7 it established protections for a suspect under interrogation
similar to the civilian's rights established by the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois28 and Mirandav. Arizona. 9 Incidentally, in its Miranda
decision the United States Supreme Court commented favorably on
the military's practice of furnishing lawyers as free defense counsel °
The basic 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice stopped short of
requiring free lawyers as defense counsel in all trials before special
courts-martial; instead it only required such lawyers in the rare cases
where the "trial counsel," i.e. the prosecutor, was a lawyer. The 1950
Code accorded defendants before special courts-martial only the old
31
right to a non-lawyer officer to serve as their defense counseL
22. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27 (a)-(b), 10 U.S.C. §§ 827(a)-(b) (1964).
23. Id.
24. Id. art. 32(b), 10 U.S.C. S832(b) (1964).
25. Id. art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964).
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United
States v. Powell, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 364, 32 C.M.R. 364 (1962); United States v. Brown,
13 U.S.C.MA. 14, 32 C.M.R. 14 (1962); United States v. Odenweller, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
71, 32 C.M.R. 71 (1962); United States v. Tomaszewski, 8 U.S.C.MA.. 266, 24 C.M.R.
76 (1957); United States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
28. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). I
30. Id. at 489.
31. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964); Sherman,
The Right to Competeit iCunsel in Special Courts Martial, 54 A.B.J. 866 (1968),'
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At first glance it might seem that this practice is in line with or even
ahead of the civilian courts, where in misdemeanor cases an accused
still has no right either to a free lawyer or even to a free non-lawyer as
defense counsel. The fact that special courts-martial can not order
confinement for periods of over six months and that they usually deal
with relatively minor offenses, invites such a comparison. But it would
be a mistake to assume that special courts-martial hear only misdemeanor
cases, and that therefore there is no more need to supply a free lawyer
to an accused before a special court-martial than to a civilian being
tried for a misdemeanor in a civilian court. There is no felony-misdemeanor dichotomy in the military justice system. And special courtsmartial are authorized to try any non-capital offense that general
courts-martial may try2 2 Felony-type cases including offenses involving moral turpitude are tried by special courts-martial, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows special courts, under certain circumstances, to order the severe penalty of a bad conduct discharge.3
A federal district court in Application of Stapely, a 1965 habeas
corpus case 34 which has received considerable comment, 5 focused attention on the injustice of withholding a free lawyer as defense counsel
to defendants appearing before special courts who were charged with
serious offenses. In that case the military, complying with statutory
requirements,3" had furnished two non-lawyer officers as defense counsel to a defendant charged before a special court-martial with a series
of offenses including fraud and the passing of several worthless checks.
The accused's timely request for representation by a lawyer was refused, and he was convicted. The court spoke of the good faith of
all concerned, but also commented on the inadequacy of representation
by inexperienced officers representing an accused charged with serious offenses, and granted the writ of habeas corpus.
The Stapely case did not go so far as to require a lawyer in all cases
before special courts-martial, but only dealt with cases involving serious charges. Indeed, the holding did not directly require an actual
lawyer in even the serious cases, but implied that a trained, experienced,
capable non-lawyer might satisfy the requirement of due process.
32. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 19, 10 U.S.C. at § 819 (1964).
33. Id.

34. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
35. 15 AM. U. L. REv. 376 (1966); 54 GEo. L.J. 1011 (1966); 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1302

(1966).
36. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. 5 827(c) (1964).
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The United States Court of Military Appeals missed an excellent opportunity to anticipate the Stapely decision in its 1963 decision in
United States v. Culp.37 An enlisted marine had been convicted by a
Navy special court-martial on charges of theft and had been ordered
discharged on the basis of bad conduct. At the court-martial he was
represented by non-lawyer counsel. The Navy's Board of Review reversed the conviction on the ground that the accused was entitled as
a matter of right under the sixth amendment of the Constitution to
counsel qualified in the law, unless he competently and intelligently
waived such right. The Board of Review thus went further than the
later Stapely holding, but the United States Court of Military Appeals
in affirming the Board of Review's reversal of the conviction did so
on grounds unrelated to the constitutionality of trial without a lawyer
as defense counsel. In separate opinions all three judges on that court
agreed that in general the protections of the Constitution applied to
servicemen being tried by courts-martial, but two judges were satisfied that the non-lawyer counsel furnished the defendant was sufficient
"counsel." The third judge expressed strong objections on constitutional
grounds to trial by special courts-martial without legally trained defense counsel, but commented that in the case before them the accused had waived that right by agreeing to be represented by nonlawyers.
Even though the Culp decision did not confirm a constitutional
right to a lawyer as defense counsel in special courts-martial, and the
Stapely decision was limited both in its holding and its geographical
applicability, the military authorities have in recent years held to a
minimum the number of special courts-martial without lawyers as defense counsel3 8
The 1968 Military Justice Act does not extend to an accused appearing before special courts-martial the absolute right to a lawyer as
defense counsel which is the rule in general courts-martial. Instead it
gives a conditional right, depending on geography or exigencies of the
service. The 1968 Act adds the following paragraph to Article 27 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
[T] he accused shall be afforded the opportunity to be represented
at the [special court-martial] trial by [a lawyer-counsel with the
same additional qualifications as pertain in general courts-martial]
37. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
38. O'Malley, Broader Justice for Military Personnel, TRtA,

Dec.-Jan. 1968-69, at 45.
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unless counsel having such qualifications cannot be obtained on
account of physical conditions or military exigencies. If counsel
having such qualifications cannot be obtained, the court may be
convened and the trial held but the convening authority shall make
a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating
why such counsel could not be obtained .... 39
This 1968 amendment looks two ways. In granting the right to free
lawyer counsel in special courts-martial where military lawyers are
available for such duty, the military justice system again has become
more progressive than the civilian court system. Coupled with another 1968 Act amendment" allowing an accused to refuse trial by
the still lawyerless summary court-martial (to be covered later in this
article) it means that even for the most insignificant misdemeanors an
accused must be furnished free lawyer counsel unless such counsel is
not available.
This 1968 Amendment looks backward, however, in allowing the
huge loophole by which the newly extended right to a lawyer as defense counsel can, and no doubt frequently will, be circumvented. It
is to be expected that, operating under these 1968 guidelines set by
Congress, the Navy and Marines will continue uninterrupted their
policy of holding special courts-martial without lawyers aboard vessels which do not carry assigned lawyers. Only a few of the Navy's
vessels, such as the battleship New Jersey and the largest aircraft carriers, have assigned lawyers aboard. The Army and Air Force may
take this amendment as authorization to disregard the Stapely41 decision
and, in situations where military lawyers are not available, revert to
the earlier practice of holding special courts-martial without providing a free lawyer as defense counsel.
The judge who wrote the Stapely decision set out a better standard
than Congress did in the matter. There was no urgent necessity for
Congress to guarantee a free lawyer, if one is available, for every soldier,
sailor, or airman involved in any minor offense. On the other hand,
there should be an absolute rather than a conditional right to, an appointed military lawyer as counsel for anyone charged with a serious
offense.
The 1968 Act makes a major improvement in removing the pos39. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C.A. S827(c) (Supp. Feb.
1969).
40. Id. art. 20, 10 U.S.C.A. § 820 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
.41. Application :of Stapely, 246F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).

19691

THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF

1968

sibility of a lawyerless defendant being issued a bad conduct discharge.
It provides that "[a] bad-conduct discharge may not be adjudged [by
a special court] unless . . . [legally trained and certified] counsel
,
was detailed to represent the accused ....
QUALIFIED LAWYERS AS JUDGES TO PRESME OVER COURTS-MARTIAL

The right of an accused to a lawyer to serve as defense counsel is a
basic constitutional right, recognized in various ways early in civilian
prosecutions and more recently in trials by courts-martial. Closely
related to this right is the equally important matter of providing judges
who are fair, honest, impartial, responsible, free from outside influence
and control, and "learned in the law," to preside over criminal trials
including courts-martial. Indeed, a defendant without a lawyer who
is tried by a fair judge "learned in the law" might receive more protection than would a defendant with an attorney who is tried not by a
legally-trained judge but by a group of non-lawyers selected, in effect,
by the prosecutor's boss to serve on an ad hoc basis.
The Magna Carta of King John expressly provided that judges
would be learned in the law. As translated, its forty-fifth chapter
states: "We will not make justiciars, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs except such as know the law of the realm and are well inclined to observe it [emphasis added]." " But this right to have a learned judge
preside over one's trial did not take root in the Anglo-American legal
system. King John's son and successor, Henry III, omitted that provision from his own Great Charter,4" and the right was lost. Even
now there is no constitutional prerequisite of a legal education for appointment to any federal court, even to the United States Supreme
Court. Many persons without formal legal education serve as judges
in state and local courts, though few if any federal judges lack a legal
education.
Until the Uniform Code of Military Justice went into effect in 19504
42. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 19, 10 U.S.C.A. S 819 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
43. AMERICAN BAR FouNDATioN, SoutrcEs OF OuR LBERTmS 18 (R. Perry & J. Cooper
eds. 1959) sets forth this language from the original document of June 15, 1215. The
introductory materials therein note that this original document differs substantially
from the reissue of 1225 (9 Hen. 3, c. 1-37) which is the document to which scholars
believe the term "Magna Carta" originally applied. Id. at 4-5, 11 n.35. A. E. HowRA,
THE RoAD FROM RuN ymEDE, 147 (1968).
44. 9 Hen. 3, c. 1-37; SouxcEs OF OUR LIBERTIES, s pra note 43, at 18 n.79.
45. 10 US.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
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there was no assurance and little chance that a trained lawyer would
serve as a member of a court-martial trying an American serviceman.
Instead, he would almost always be tried by a group of officers whose
principal legal "training" had been the quick scanning of some manual
on military justice and courts-martial. The new Code made a tremendous innovation by requiring that trained lawyers, called "law officers,"
participate in a quasi-judicial capacity in general courts-martial." Nonlawyer officers continued to serve as members of the general court and
to perform many important functions.7 That Code made no provisions, however, for law officers for either special or summary courtsmartial, which were accordingly left to continue without trained lawyers to serve in any judicial or quasi-judicial status. This lack at the
level of special and summary courts-martial was compounded by the
absence of lawyers as counsel for either the defense or prosecution.4 8
The Military Justice Act of 1968 authorizes three types of special
court-martial:
(A) not less than three members; or
(B) a military judge and not less than three members; or
(C) only a military judge, if one has been detailed to the court ....

9

The term "military judge" is a new title, established by the 1968 Act,
and has replaced the previously designated post of law officer.50 An
earlier requirement of membership in a federal or state bar remains. 51
Thus the 1968 Act gives a renewed lease on life to the old style court
composed of officers without legal training, but the Act takes much
of the sting from a court so composed by depriving it in most cases
of what had been its most severe punishment, that of ordering a bad
conduct discharge. The 1968 Act provides:
A bad-conduct discharge may not be adjudged unless . . . a military judge was detailed to the trial, except in any case in which a
military judge could not be detailed to the trial because of physical
52
conditions or military exigencies.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. S 826(a) (1964).
Id. art. 25(a), 10 U.S.C. § 825(a) (1964).
Id. art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964).
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16(2), 10 U.S.C.A. § 816(2) (Supp. Feb.

1969).
50. Id. art. 1 (10), 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (10) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
51. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (1964).
52. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 19, 10 U.S.CA. § 819 (Supp. Feb. 1969).

1969]

THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF

1968

The issuance of a bad conduct discharge is a drastic penalty, which
can have serious effects on the recipient for the rest of his life. The
Army for many years has as a matter of policy withheld this possible
punishment from its special courts-martial, but Navy and Marine Corps
special courts-martial regularly issue bad-conduct discharges. Time will
tell whether the Navy and Marine Corps will try to continue their
practice of issuing bad-conduct discharges through special courts without military judges, using the new Act's escape clause of "any case
in which a military judge could not be detailed to the trial because of
physical conditions or military exigencies." Prompt hearings followed
immediately by appropriate punishment are essential to maintenance
of discipline, especially at sea, but the bad-conduct discharge is too
severe and lasting a punishment to be left, at least in peacetime, to line
officers without legal training.
Except for the above restriction as to bad-conduct discharges, the
1968 Act does not change the penalties which may be imposed by a
special court-martial sitting without a military judge. Article 19 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice still provides:
Special courts-martial may, under such limitations as the President
may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this
chapter except death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, confinement for more than six months, hard labor without confinement
for more than three months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds3
pay per month, or forfeiture of pay for more than six monthsY
The same article continues to confer on special courts-martial "jurisdiction to try persons subject to [the Uniform Code of Military Justice]
for any non-capital offense made punishable by [that Code] and, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, for capital offenses." The great bulk of the caseload of special courts sitting without military judges will probably continue to consist of routine, cutand-dried prosecutions for purely military offenses which do not involve moral turpitude, such as absence without leave or insubordinate
conduct towards a sergeant. Such military offenses have traditionally
fallen within the exclusive jurisdiction of our military court system.
It is appropriate to leave jurisdiction over them to the military system,
with the built-in protections that only courts-martial with military
53. 10 U.S.C. §819 (1964).
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judges may order penalties more severe than those established by Article 19.
It is unfortunate that the 1968 Act left undisturbed the jurisdiction
of special courts without military judges over serious civilian-type offenses involving moral turpitude, such as larceny, robbery, sodomy,
burglary, and perjury. 4 Such non-military offenses, if committed within the United States could well have been left by Congress to the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular civilian authorities. Fortunately the
Supreme Court's O'Callaban decision has gone a long way toward
remedying that deficiency, at least in peacetime. It is to be hoped that
high level policy will require that a military judge be assigned to
every special court-martial where the defendant is charged with a
serious offense involving moral turpitude.
Situations will arise in which only one properly qualified lawyer is
available to participate in a special court-martial. He may not serve as
prosecutor (trial counsel); Article 27(c) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice has forbidden that since 1950. 55 But the question may
arise as to whether the single qualified lawyer is to be the military judge
or the defense counsel. Article 27 as amended requires that if a qualified lawyer is available he must be assigned as defense counsel;- 6 the
discretionary authority to appoint a military judge to serve with a special court-martial under Article 1617 as amended could hardly be construed as qualifying or weakening the right to a lawyer, if available,
as defense counsel. Regardless of unavailability of a lawyer, a bad-conduct discharge may not be ordered unless the defendant is represented
by a qualified lawyer.58
TRIAL BY A JUDGE SITTING ALONE

The establishment of the right of an accused to a trial by jury, as
distinct from a trial by a judge or judges alone, and the extension of
this right from its limited early confines, have been two of the outstanding developments of Anglo-American jurisprudence. There has
been little interest shown in developing a correlative right to trial
by a judge alone, however, despite the occasional advantage to a defendant of avoiding foreseeable prejudice on the part of any available
54. Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 118-31, 10 US.C. §§ 918-31 (1964).
55. 10 U.S.C. S 827(c) (1964).
56. 10 U.S.C.A. §827(c) (1) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
57. Id. §816(2) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
58. Id. § 819 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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jurors. Perhaps the best known instance of deliberate waiver of trial
by jury was in the joint trial of Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold,
in which Clarence Darrow realized that, because of widespread public
outrage, any foreseeable jury would be apt to be so prejudiced against
his clients that it would send them to the gallows. 59
Rule 23 (C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a
case to be tried without a jury, but neither the United States Constitution, the federal statutes, nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
grant a defendant in a criminal prosecution any right to trial without a
jury. The federal courts often allow defendants in criminal cases to
waive jury trial, but appellate courts consistently uphold denials by
federal district courts of defendants' requests for trials without juries. 0
The military justice system never allowed trial of an accused at the
general or special court-martial level by a judge alone. Instead, trial
was held before "The Court-Martial," which consisted of a group of
officers whose minimum number was set by law. The Uniform Code
of Military Justice introduced the legally-trained law officer into the
world of the general court-martial (but not the special court-martial)
but made no provision for the law officer to function as a judge sitting
alone."' The Military Justice Act of 1968 introduces into the military
justice system the opportunity for an accused to request trial by the
military judge alone. Article 16 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as amended provides that general courts-martial may consist of:
Only a military judge, if before the court is assembled the accused, knowing the identity of the military judge and after consultation with defense counsel, requests in writing a court composed only of a military judge and the military judge approves.
062

and the 1968 Act adds:
However, a general court-martial [with a military judge sitting
alone] shall not have jurisdiction to try any person for any offense
for which the death penalty may be adjudged unless the case has
been previously referred to trial as a noncapital case. 63
59. C. DARROW, THE STORY OF My LiFE (1932).
60. E.g., Singer v. United States, 380 US. 24 (1965); United States v. Igoe, 331 F.2d
766 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 942 (1965); Dixon v. United States, 292 F.2d
768 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
61. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
*.
62. 10 U.S.C.A. § 816(1) (B) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
justice
art.
18,
10
U.S.C.A.
§
818
(Supp. Feb. 1969).
63. Uniform Code of MKtary
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and Article 16 of the Code as amended provides that special courtsmartial may consist of:
Only a military judge, if one has been detailed to the court, and the
accused under the same conditions as those prescribed [for a general court-martial] so requests. ....
.4

It should be noted that the new Act gives the military judge the
discretionary power to grant or deny the defendant's request for a
trial by jury alone. In general courts-martial, which by law must have
a military judge, there is no way for the "Convening Authority" (the
higher commander who established the court martial) to prevent a
trial by a military judge sitting alone, but a commander who appoints
a special court-martial can preclude the possibility of a defendant being tried by a military judge sitting alone by not appointing a military
judge to the special court-martial.
It will be interesting to watch the development of defense strategy
and of counter-strategy under this new provision. Except for the military judge, the officers who compose a court-martial are almost always from the same major unit (vessel, division) as the accused, are
familiar with "local" problems, including those related to enforcing
discipline in general, and with any special problems connected with
particular types of offenses. It may develop that a large proportion of
defendants will seek trial by judge alone rather than face a group of
"local" officers, hand picked by the local commander.
THE SUMMARY COURT, THE

LOWEST COURT

IN

THE MILITARY

JUSTICE SYSTEM

The summary court-martial is the lowest court in the military justice
system. In several ways it is roughly equivalent to the criminal "side"
of a justice of the peace court. A single, part-time judge constitutes the
court; there is no requirement that such a judge have a legal education
and it is extremely rare that a trained lawyer will actually serve as
such a court; the court may issue only light sentences. Article 20 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice withholds from summary courts
any power to issue punitive discharges, limits its sentences of confinement to one month, and its "fines" to two thirds of one month's pay. 5
64. 10 U.S.C.A. S 816(2) (C) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
65. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
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So far, no right to free legal counsel has developed for defendants being tried by summary courts.
The summary court differs in important ways from the typical
civilian justice of the peace court. The summary court judge receives
no extra compensation in any form for his activities as a judge; he
does not seek or, usually, even want the job, but is assigned to it as an
extra duty by his commanding officer; and his "term of office" is
usually of short duration and can be terminated at any time by the
officer who appointed him.
Despite its inferior status and scanty sentencing power, a summary
court conviction can be a serious matter because the record follows
the convicted defendant throughout his military career and into civilian
life, and, unlike the lowest civilian courts, it has jurisdiction not only
over relatively petty offenses but over any non-capital offense under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This includes such serious offenses as grand larceny.66 The practice, however, is to refer only minor
offenses for trial by summary court.
The 1968 Act amends the summary court article of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice by providing that:
No person . . . may be brought to trial before a summary courtmartial if he objects thereto ....
If objection to trial by summary
court-martial is made by an accused, trial may be ordered by
special or general court-martial as appropriate. 7
A proper understanding of the effect of this amendment requires
consideration of an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
which was not directly amended by the 1968 Act, namely Article 15,
the so-called "Non-judicial Punishment" article. This article recognizes
and governs the age-old power of a commanding officer to investigate
suspected offenses by members of his command and to order punishment, all with few more formalities than are observed by a harried
young mother when investigating and punishing the unauthorized removal and consumption of cookies from the cookie jar by her preschool offspring. Now strict limits are set on possible punishments to be
inflicted under the commanding officer's power, and only minor offenses

are supposed to be punished thereunder. 6s The strictly limited quasi66. id.
67. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 20, 10 U.S.C.A. § 820 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
68. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 20, 10 U.S.C. §820 (-1964).
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judicial powers of modern commanders are pale reflections of their
awesome predecessors, the absolute life and death power of Roman
generals over their troops, °9 and the license to tyrannical sadism exercised by the infamous Captain Bligh.
The non-judicial punishment article allows persons who are about
to be punished under it to demand trial by court-martial in lieu of
receiving punishment from their commanding officer. (This right is
not available to persons embarked upon vessels.) 70 An officer who demands trial by court-martial rather than submit to "non-judicial punishment" by his commanding officer runs no risk of being tried by a summary court because summary courts-martial have no jurisdiction to
try officers. An enlisted suspect who has been ordered to stand trial
by summary court without having been involved in "non-judicial punishment" for that offense can avoid being tried by a summary court
by making timely objection to such a trial. In these two situations
there is no difference between the practice before and after the 1968
amendment to the summary court article. The difference is that prior
to the 1968 amendment an enlisted man who had been caught up in
the non-judicial punishment mill was placed in a dilemma: he had to
either accept the impending non-judicial punishment by his commanding officer or run the risk of being tried by a summary court without
a right to demand trial by a higher court instead. The 1968 Act eliminates this dilemma; the enlisted man now (unless embarked on a vessel) may refuse to submit to non-judicial punishment and then, if
ordered to stand trial before a summary court, he may refuse such trial
as well.
In this matter, as in others, the military justice system is well ahead
of the civilian systems prevalent in many states. It would be a major
improvement in the administration of justice if a civilian involved in
some relatively minor offense could avoid trial by the justice of the
peace, the police court, or comparable non-lawyer, non-jury courts
by exercising a right to trial by a higher, presumably better trained
judge, with a jury. Such a change would not put an end to inferior courts, but would encourage most of their "judges" to follow
the judicial norms observed by the higher trial courts. It would also
tend to eliminate greedy, unfair, fine-oriented, arbitrary, ignorant, and
otherwise undesirable characters from the ranks of inferior court judges.
69. C. BRAND, supra note 1, at 23, 63-82.
70. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 15, 10 US.C. S 815 (1964).
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THE INFLUENCE OF COMMANDING OFFICERS OVER PERSONNEL OF

COURTS-MARTIAL

In civilian life the struggle to free the judiciary from control by the
executive has had a long history. The executive retains considerable
powers in connection with original appointments to judicial vacancies,
de jure, as in the appointment of federal judges, or de facto, as in states
where judges are elected but where many were originally appointed
by a governor to fill an unexpired term. Aside from the executive's
continuing power of at least original appointment of judges, the public
now takes for granted the judge's freedom from executive control
over the judicial process. Sir Edward Coke's famous claim to such
freedom from King James I, though unsuccessful, paved the way for
the less famous growth of such judicial freedom following the deposition of King James' son and successor, Charles I.
A comparable movement toward a "judiciary" free from executive
influence over judicial decisions has been in progress within our military establishment for decades. 71 The 1968 Act furthers this laudable
trend both by codifying recent judicial decisions and by introducing
new limitations on the executive, i.e., the senior officer, who commands
a major unit or large vessel and also appoints the personnel of courtsmartial.
The "convening authority," who appoints the personnel of a courtmartiaF 2 and who orders particular cases to be on its docket,73 is in a
strategic position to influence the course of action to be taken by
courts-martial. He has the power of original appointment, there is
no life tenure or set term of office on courts-martial, and he
may, as he chooses, remove individual members from duty on courtsmartial, 74 or terminate completely a court-martial panel.75 These powers
remain unaffected by the 1968 Act, and are thus far unchallenged. It
is only natural that commanders appoint as members of courts-martial
officers who they expect will in general be concerned about the maintenance of discipline and who will not be unduly swayed towards
71. Id. art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).
72. Id. art. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. § 822-24 (1964); MANUAL FOR COTJms-MARTL UNITED
STATES 1968, 36, 33 Fed. Reg. 13551-52 (1968).
73. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 34, 10 U.S.C. S834 (1964); MANUAL FoR
COURTS-MARTIAL UITED STATES 1968,
5 (6), 33 Fed. Reg. 13516 (1968).
74. MANUAL FOR CoURTS-MARTIAL UNrE!) STATES 1968, 37, 33 Fed. Reg. 13552-53
(1968).
75. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNrE STATES 1968, 5 (6), 33 Fed. Reg. 13516
(1968).
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leniency. Service on courts-martial is always a temporary duty and
often is only a part-time responsibility. The members are, for most
if not all purposes, under the command of the senior officers who appointed them to serve on the court-martial, and are mindful of all
that such a subordinate relationship entails in the military. For an ambitious, career-minded officer, the wrath of the higher commander is
to be avoided if at all possible.
The 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice took one step toward
limiting improper "command influence." It provided in Article 37:
No authority convening a . . . court-martial .

.

. may censure,

reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge
or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its
or his functions. .

.

. No person subject to this chapter may at-

tempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the
action of a court-martial... or any member thereof, in reaching
the findings or sentence in any case .... 76
Since 1950 many over-zealous commanders have violated both the spirit
and the literal wording of the above article, and many convicted defendants have sought to enlarge loopholes on appeal by claiming undue "command influence" over the members of the court-martial which
had convicted them.
The 1968 Act makes two additions to the command influence provision (Article 37) .77 It seeks to minimize possible adverse effects on
the career of a subordinate officer who, as a member of a court-martial,
as a military judge, or as defense counsel takes actions which displease
his commanding officer, the convening authority. An addition to Article 37 reads:
In the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report,
or any other report or document used .

.

. for . . . determining

whether a member of the armed forces is qualified to be advanced,
in grade, or in determining the assignment or transfer of a member
of the armed forces or in determining whether a member of the
armed forces should be retained on active duty, no person subject
to this chapter may, in preparing any such report (1) consider or
evaluate the performance of duty of any such member as a member
76. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).

77. Id.
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of a court-martial, or (2) give a less favorable rating or evaluation
of any member of the armed forces because of the zeal with which
such member, as counsel, represented any accused before a court78
martial.
The foregoing addition, if followed conscientiously, would go far
toward freeing court members to follow their own convictions, and
might indirectly prove beneficial to many accused. But what ambitious
subordinate officer can be sure that his own commander, who holds
such awesome powers over his career, will completely disregard a vote
for acquittal in what the commander had considered an "open-andshut" case, especially if a serious crime was involved? This well-meant
amendment will come into full effect at the same time that all jurors in
civilian courts actually disregard improper comments that judges instruct them to disregard. A more effective solution to this problem of
"command influence," but one far more complex and costly to implement, would be to maintain panels of officers available for temporary
duty with units to which they are not assigned, whose commanding
officers have no control over their careers, for service as members of
courts-martial. By using serious, conscientious reserve officers for staffing such panels during short tours of active duty a great load of extra
court-martial duty would be taken from the "regular." Reserve officers, many of whom find it administratively difficult to obtain short
tours of annual duty (needed for retention in the reserves) would have
this new area open to them, and, most importantly, the accused would
have a better chance of having truly independent members of the courtmartial deciding his fate.
Another provision of the 1968 Act dealing with command influence
amends Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to authorize
the convening authority or other commanders to conduct or to othervise provide for the members and other personnel of courts-martial
"... general instructional or informational courses in military justice
if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of instructing members of a command in the substantive and procedural aspects of courtsmartial ....,,711
This provision is based on decisions from cases in which personnel
had appealed their convictions on the grounds that such instructions
or "courses" furnished to court-martial personnel prior to or during
78. 10 U.S.C.A. §837(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
79. 10 U.S.C.A. §837 (a) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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trial amounted to prejudicial, improper command influence. One recent
decision, United States v. Clayton, 0 approved of a general orientation
briefing by the staff judge advocate, shortly before the court-martial
convened, where the briefing did no more than acquaint the court
members with the nature and importance of a court-martial and the
responsibilities of serving on a court, and did not mention specific
crimes or that certain types of criminals, such as thieves, should be
eliminated from the military service. A recent decision of the United
States Court of Military Appeals declared it improper "command influence" for a staff judge advocate to lecture to court-martial personnel after they were assembled with the accused and were ready to
convene formally, and added that he entered on dangerous ground
when in his instruction he strayed from a general orientation on trial
procedure to other matters such as special interests of the military community."' One of the judges in a concurring opinion in that case restated his long-held position that "so called orientation lectures constitute command control.... The 'education' involved ... becomes one
of pointing courts towards convictions and heavy sentences regardless
of the evidence." The concurring judge concluded with the comment:
One can hardly imagine a police chief or prosecutor being allowed
to deliver a lecture to a jury in civilian life immediately before trial.
...Nothing has ever persuaded me that the rigors of military
discipline require a different procedure. Fundamental fairness is
the same in either milieu, and it ill behooves any officer sworn to
uphold the laws to engage in what is nothing less than common
82
jury fixing.
The 1968 Act amendment to Article 3783 gives congressional sanction

to what the concurring judge labeled "common jury fixing." The military courts may decide that this part of the 1968 Act, and the legis-

lative intent which prompted it, were merely to confirm the line of
decisions exemplified by
no major change should
system. But more could
1968 Act and searching

the Clayton decision, 4 in which eventuality
be expected from within the military court
become involved here than interpreting the
for legislative intent. The above concurring

80. 37 C.M.R. 883 (1967).

81.
82.
83.
84.

United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 110, 37 C.M.R. 374 (1967).
Id. at 114, 37 C.M.R. at 378.
10 U.S.C.A. S 837(a) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
37 C.M.R. 883 (1967).
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opinion in the Wright case"' was based on the judge's interpretation of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but makes sound analogies which
could be used as points of departure in arguing unconstitutional deprivation of due process.
Freedom of courts-martial personnel from command influence has been
an important issue in many cases since adoption of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice in 1950. Law officers (now called military judges)
were included with members of the court in the list of persons who
were to be free from command influence.86 No special safeguards were
provided for law officers in this respect; they were subordinate officers
under the command of the convening authority in all respects, as were
the members of the court. The 1968 Act gives military judges far
more effective safeguards against vindictive convening authorities than
it gives to regular members of the court. As amended, Article 26 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice has the following new provision:
The military judge of a general court-martial shall be designated
by the Judge Advocate General, or his designee . . . for detail
by the convening authority, and, unless the court-martial was convened by the President or the Secretary concerned, neither the
convening authority nor any member of his staff shall prepare or
review any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the military judge so detailed, which relates to his performance of duty as a military judge. A commissioned officer
who is certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge of a
general court-martial may perform such duties only when he is
assigned and directly responsible to the Judge Advocate General,
or his designee, of the armed force of which the military judge is
a member .... 87
It will
judges
justice
similar

be noted that the above amendment applies only to military
detailed to general courts-martial. It would serve the interests of
if the military services would, on their own initiative, extend
protections to military judges assigned to special courts-martial.
THE USE OF DEPOSmONS AND THE ABSENCE OF A RIGHT
TO CONFRONTATION

One of the most glaring differences between civilian criminal procedure and procedure under the Uniform Code of Military Justice is
85. United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 110,113,37 C.M.R. 374, 377 (1967).

86. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 37, 10 US.C. S837 (1964).
87. 10 U.S.C.A. S826(c) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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the admission into evidence against defendants at courts-martial of
depositions given by persons who are not themselves present at the
court-martial. Civilian courts, both state and federal, abide by the directive of the sixth amendment that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . . .be confronted with the witnesses
against him .. ." 88
The military does not abide by this directive. Congress treats this constitutional directive as being inapplicable to the military justice system.
Article 49 of the 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice provides in
general for the taking of depositions, and it allows the prosecution to
read properly taken depositions as evidence against the accused at courtsmartial, provided the death penalty may not be adjudged, if:
(1) the witness resides or is beyond the State, territory, Commonwealth or District of Columbia in which the court .. .is
ordered to sit, or beyond ... 100 miles from the place of
trial .. .
(2) that the witness by reason of death, age, sickness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, military necessity, nonamenability to
process, or other reasonable cause, is unable or refuses to appear and testify in person at the place of trial or hearing; or
(3) that the present whereabouts of the witness is unknown.8 9
The 1968 Act makes no drastic change to this continuing lack of a
right to in-court confrontation of hostile witnesses. The 1968 Act improves a structure which stands in need, not of improvement, but of
removal. The improvement in this area consists of an amendment to
Article 49 to allow military judges "for good cause" to forbid the
taking of depositions in particular casesf 0 Prior to this salutory amendment this power to prohibit the taking of depositions rested exclusively
with "an authority competent to convene a court-martial for the trial
of those charges," 91that is, the commanding officer who in almost all
cases had no legal training and who naturally was more concerned with
maintaining discipline than with extending constitutional protections.
The theory that the sixth amendment does not apply to military trials
is gradually dying, 92 but this segment of the 1968 Act shows that Con88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 49(d), 10 U.S.C. § 849(d) (1964).
10 U.S.C.A. §849(a) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 49(a), 10 U.S.C. §849(a) (1964).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152 (1953)
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gress is still trying to breathe life into it. It would have been better if

Congress, instead of "passing the buck" to individual military judges,
had either completely withdrawn the power of the military to deny
defendants the right to confrontation of hostile witnesses, or at least
limited such practice to cases which do not involve moral turpitude
and in which no severe penalty could be adjudged.
Like Congress, courts within the military justice system have failed
to apply to courts-martial the sixth amendment guarantee of confrontation of witnesses. But, like Congress, they have established certain laudable but minor rights for defendants in this matter of depositions.: The United States Court of Military Appeals has held that a
defendant has a right to consult with privately-retained civilian counsel
concerning the taking of depositions and to be represented by such
civilian counsel at the taking of depositions even though he had been
provided with qualified military counsel.9" Guidelines for law officers
to follow in instructing members of courts-martial about depositions
have been established in three recent decisions. 4 In enforcing Article
49(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, depositions have been
held completely unauthorized where taken before formal charges against
a suspect had been signed.
The 1968 Manual for Courts-Martial, which is the "Bible" for personnel involved in court-martial activities, follows Article 49 of the
1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice and decisions within the military court system in instructing its readers as to the taking and use of
depositions.96 It does not mention the "right to confrontation," and
it can be predicted that court-martial personnel, relying on this manual,
will continue to assume that the right to confrontation does not apply to
courts-martial.
(dissenting opinion); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967);
Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military justice: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial Convictions, 61 CoLuM. L. REv. 40 (1961); Henderson, Courts-Martialand the Constitution:
The Original Understanding,71 HAiv. L. REv. 293 (1957); Sherman, The Right to Competent Counsel in Special Courts Martial,54 A.B.A.J. 866 (1968).
93. United States v. Donati, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 34 C.M.R. 15 (1963). United States
v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960), had established an accused's right

to be represented by counsel at the taking of depositions.
94. United States v. Brown, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 390, 38 C.M.R. 188 (1968); United States
v. Griffin, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 387, 38 C.M.R. 185 (1968); United States v. Dunn, 39 C.M.R.
(1969).

95. United States v. Burnom, 35 C.M.R. 908 (1965).
96. MANtuAaL FOR Couwrs-MIA.AL Uurra STAins 1968,

(1968).

145(a), 33 Fed. Reg. 13762-64
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Surprisingly, as of 1 January 1969 the federal civilian courts had not
rendered a single reported decision construing the deposition article
of the 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice 1 Three decisions of
lower federal courts since World War II arising from pre-1950 courtsmartial upheld the admission of depositions in evidence against a defendant where the defendant or his counsel had during the trial consented to the introduction of the deposition but had, after conviction,
sought relief from the civilian court based on such use of a deposition.
In one of these cases the court in dictum commented:
The petitioner had a constitutional right to be confronted by witnesses, but this right may be, and was, waived by petitioner by
entering into written stipulations signed by his counsel and himself, agreeing to the use of written statements of witnesses in lieu
of their production in court. 8
In the other two cases the courts did not explicitly confirm the applicability in courts-martial of the right to confrontation, but in denying relief to the petitioners they commented on the petitioners' having
agreed during the trial to the use of the depositions. 99
If an accused and his counsel before and during trial were to object
unequivocally to the taking and introduction in evidence of a deposition against an accused and if, despite the objection,, the deposition were
taken and introduced in evidence at the court-martial, a resourceful,
zealous defense counsel on appeal would have the makings of what
might well be another landmark decision. The Court of Military Appeals has shown itself to be receptive to the extension of constitutional
protections into new areas of military law, 10 0 and the prevailing mood
of civilian federal courts suggests that at some level they would grant
relief to a petitioner in an appropriate case.
HEARINGS, SPEEDY TRIALS, AND CONTiNuANcES

In various ways the 1968 Act increases the authority, responsibility
and scope of activity of military judges and brings their position more
into line with that of civilian judges in criminal cases. While doing so
it reduces the judicial aspects of the role of the members of general
97. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 49, 10 U.S.C. S 849 (1964).
98. Bums ex rel. Burns v. Sanford, 77 F. Supp. 464, 465 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
99. Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953); Hayes v. Hunter, 83 F. Supp.
940 (D. Kan. 1948).
100. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).

1969]

THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF

1968

courts-martial and of special courts-martial with military judges, and
in effect increases the resemblance of the members' collective role to
that of a civilian jury.
A major example of this development is provided by the 1968 Act's
amendment to Article 39 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
dealing with sessions of courts-martial. The amendment does not affect
special courts sitting without military judges or summary courts which
never have military judges, nor does it deal with the newly authorized
practice of a military judge alone, without court members, constituting
a general or special court-martial. For courts-martial consisting of both
military judge and court members the 1968 amendment to Article 39
provides:
(a) At any time after the service of charges which have been re-

ferred to trial ...

the military judge may ...

call the court

into session without the presence of the members for the purpose of(1) hearing and determining motions raising defenses or objections which are capable of determination without trial of
the issues raised by a plea of not guilty;
(2) hearing and ruling upon any matter which may be ruled
upon by the military judge under this chapter, whether or not
the matter is appropriate for later consideration or decision by
the members of the court;
(3) if permitted by regulations of the Secretary concerned,
holding the arraignment and receiving the pleas of the accused; and
(4) performing any other procedural function which may be
performed by the military judge under this chapter or under
the rules prescribed [by the President by regulations] . . .
and which does not require the presence of members of the
court.
These proceedings shall be conducted in the presence of the accused, the defense counsel, and the trial counsel and shall be made

a part of the record.101

The foregoing amendment does not in itself prevent an accused from

being ordered to appear at one of the newly authorized hearings without time for his counsel to prepare for the hearing. The 1968 Act,
101. 10 US.CA. § 839(a) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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however, meets this problem by amending Article 35 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, which, incorporating older laws, provides:
[I] n time of peace no person may, against his objection, be brought
to trial . . . in a general court-martial case within a period of five
days after the service of charges upon him or in a special court1
martial within a period of three days after [service of charges]. 02
The 1968 amendment to the foregoing Article 35 extends that aiticle's
minimum periods to cover the newly authorized "out-of-court" hearings as well as full court trials. 10 3 The newly authorized hearings should
expedite the handling of cases without either increasing or infringing
upon any rights of the accused, and without creating any serious difficulties for either the prosecution or the defense.
The military justice system has long provided for the granting of
continuances for good cause to either side. The 1950 Uniform Code of
Military Justice did not place the exercise of this power in the hands of
the law officers of the general courts, but rather. in Article 40 left it
where it had been, in the hands of the members of the courts-martial.'
By executive action this power to grant continuances was transferred
to the law officer of general courts.0 5 The 1968 Act confirms the
executive action as to general courts and extends it to special courts
with military judges by an amendment to Article 40.106
Congress' amendment of Article 351' showed consideration for the
plight of the serviceman who otherwise might have faced an instant
hearing. In so dealing with Article 35, however, Congress strained
out the gnat but did not preclude a camel from being forced down
an accused's throat. In leaving unchanged the short five-day and threeday minimum periods between service of charges and either hearing or
trial in peacetime provided by Article 35, Congress in effect passes,
as it does in wartime, the responsibility for seeing that adequate time
for preparation is accorded defense counsel to the military judges, to
be exercised under their newly acquired continuation power. In courts
without military judges, this responsibility is left with non-lawyer mem102. Id. § 835 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
103. Id.
104. 10 U.S.C. § 840 (1964).
105. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNIrED STATES 1968,

13580-81 (1968).
106. 10 U.S.C.A. § 840 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
107. 10 U.S.C. § 835 (1964).

58(b), (e), 33 Fed. Reg.
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bers of the courts-martial. It would be more advantageous to the accused if Congress had completely eliminated the minimum period and
had forthrightly abandoned any responsibility in the matter because
courts,, both civilian and military, are apt to consider the five-day and
three-day periods as congressionally established guidelines. Better yet,
Congress should adopt a realistic minimum period to apply both in
time of peace and during war. The Founding Fathers bestowed on
us the guarantee of a speedy trial;108 from time to time the military
establishment has been known to provide not merely speedy, but nearly
instant trials. Civilian federal courts have, as of the end of 1968, shown
no inclination to bar extremely speedy trials; indeed, no federal decisions
in point arising under the 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice have
been reported.
In a 1922 case which had nothing to do with criminal matters or
courts-martial the Supreme Court transferred into the twentieth century a precept better suited to the spirit of bygone epochs:
[M]ilitary Tribunals are as necessary to secure subordination and
discipline in the army as courts are to maintain law and order in
civil life; and the experience of our Government . . . and of the
English Government [before 1776] . . . proves that a much more
expeditious procedure is necessary in military [affairs] than is
thought tolerable in civil affairs .... "o9
In 1948 a prisoner, who had been convicted by general court-martial
during World War II of murdering a fellow soldier and of misbehavior
before the enemy, petitioned a federal district court in Pennsylvania
for habeas corpus, basing his petition in part on the claim that he had
received a copy of the charges against him only five minutes prior to
the beginning of his court-martial. The district judge noted, however,
that the record of the court-martial showed that the accused had in
reality been furnished the charges on the day before the trial, and
further that at the trial prior to time for entering his pleas the defense
had answered in the negative when the president inquired whether he
had any special pleas or motions to offer. The district judge proceeded
to hold that "in this regard there was no deprivation of any constitutional right of the defendant and no denial of due process." 110
108. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
109. United States ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 343 (1922).
110. Bigrow v. Hiatt, 70 F. Supp. 826, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd., 168 F.2d 992 (3d
Cir. 1948).
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Another military defendant, convicted under the Army's pre-1950
Articles of War and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor by a
court-martial, sought habeas corpus relief claiming that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at his court-martial because, due to the
denial of his request for a continuance, his counsel did not have enough
time to prepare his defense. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1955 upheld the denial of the habeas corpus petition, commenting that:
[1]n view of the fact that defense counsel had had four days for
preparation, the denial of the motion for continuance was within
the sound judicial discretion of the court [martial] and . . . there
was no showing of an abuse of that discretion.'
It is to the credit of the military establishment, including policy
makers, appellate and review echelon officers, and personnel of courtsmartial, that injustices in the nature of too speedy trials have been
held to a minimum. It is time that Congress or the federal courts put
a complete stop to this vestige of harsher days.
CHALLENGES

Both the accused and the prosecution enjoy an established right to
challenge the military judge and the members of a court-martial. Article 41 of the 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that
either side may challenge for cause members of a general or special
court-martial and the law officer, and that the court is to determine
the relevancy and validity of such challenges for cause." 2 The Manual
for Courts-Martial 1968, an executive document which has the force
of law, requires that the trial counsel (prosecuting attorney) announce
in open court every ground for challenge which he believes to exist
in the case, and that he request the law officer and members of the
court to volunteer any information of any matter which would constitute grounds for their being challenged for cause. In addition, each
side has the opportunity to conduct a voir dire examination. Each side
is then allowed an unlimited number of challenges for cause. The members of the court, but not the law officer, could be removed from the
111. Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1955). But in Shapiro v. United
States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947), the court of claims awarded back pay to a dismissed
officer who had been tried by court martial only three hours after service of charges
and who had been denied a continuance. But prior to its decision the president had
granted the defendant a complete pardon.
112. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 41(a), 10 U.S.C. 5 841(a) (1964).
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court in a particular trial on the familiar jury trial ground of having
"formed or expressed a positive and definite opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused as to any offense charged." 113
Under the 1950 Code all general courts-martial had law officers and
members of the court, and all special courts consisted of members without law officers. 114 It was sensible in special courts-martial for the members to decide on challenges for cause, since they had no law officer
on hand to attend to the matter. Once general courts-martial acquired
law officers, however, it became anomalous for the members of the
court, who had no legal training, to perform this judicial function;
it was analogous to allowing a civilian court jury to determine not
only each others' qualifications to sit as jurors but also to determine
whether the appointed judge should be removed.
The United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
Cleveland commented:
On prior occasions when discussing the subject of challenges for
cause, this Court has stated its belief that it would be preferable for
the same to be passed upon by the law officer of a general court
rather than the court members . . . . Indeed, we have recommended enactment of legislation to that effect . . . . Considering
the facts of the present case, we strongly reaffirm that recommendation.
Nonetheless, we recognize that we are powerless ourselves to
alter the present procedure ....
There can be no doubt under
the Code and the Manual [for Courts-Martial] that, in military
law, challenges for cause must be resolved by the court itself ....
Moreover, this is so notwithstanding that such process results . . .
in the somewhat anomalous situation whereby court members
challenged on substantially the same ground are permitted to ballot
on the challenges against their fellow members, even though disqualified to vote on their own."15
Law officers have occasionally assumed the judicial prerogative of
determining the propriety of a particular member sitting on a courtmartial. It has been held proper for a law officer to remove a member
who under Article 25 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice"16 is
113. MAm.AL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNTED STATES 1968, 62(f), 33 Fed. Reg.
13588-89 (1968).
114. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1964).
115. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 213, 215, 35 C.M.R. 185, 187 (1965).
116. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1964).
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ineligible to serve even though neither side had challenged that member of the court, for example, because that member had in the course
of his duties as base information officer gathered facts about the accused's case from Air Police reports and had formulated answers to
inquiries from news media about the case. 1
It is one thing for a law officer to remove, in effect for cause, an
unqualified member of the court-martial. It is quite another thing for
a law officer to rule against a defendant's challenge for cause brought
against a member of the court, instead of referring the matter to the
members of the court for their determination. The United States Court
of Military Appeals commented that such action by the law officer was
patently erroneous in United States v. Tucker,"8 despite the fact expressed in other cases that that court favored a change in the statute
to transfer to law officers the duty of considering and ruling on challenges for cause." 9
The 1968 Act finally brings about this change long recommended
by the Court of Military Appeals. It amends Article 41 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to read:
The military judge and members of a general or special courtmartial may be challenged by the accused or the trial counsel for
cause stated to the court. The military judge, or, if none, the court,
shall determine the relevancy and validity of challenges for cause
120

Thus the 1968 Act brings the military practice as to challenges for
cause into line with the generally approved practice of civilian courts
as to challenges for cause against both judges and jurors.
The 1968 Act leaves unchanged the right of each side to one
peremptory challenge of a member of the court. As in civilian courts,
2
neither side may challenge the military judge except for cause.
RIGHT TO FREEDOM PENDING APPEAL

The 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice provided a right in
some cases to freedom from incarceration following conviction and
while appeal was pending. Article 71 (c) provides:
117. United States v. Farrow, 38 C.M.R. 895 (1968).
118. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 318, 36 C.M.R.' 474 (1966).

119 United States v. Cleveland, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 213, 215, 35 C.M.R. 185, 187 (1965).
120. 10 U.S.C.A. § 841 (a) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
121. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. S 841(b) (1964).
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No sentence which includes, unsuspended, a dishonorable or badconduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more, may be
executed until affirmed by a board of review and, in cases reviewed
22
by it, the Court of Military Appeals.
Considered by itself this guarantee is clear, but Congress confused the
matter by simultaneously providing in Article 57 (b) of the Code that:
Any period of confinement in a sentence of a court-martial begins
to run from the date the sentence is adjudged by the court-martial,
but periods during which the sentence to confinement is suspended
shall be excluded in computing the service of the term of confinement.

23

The military authorities in considering the two articles together concluded that if they gave full force to Article 57(b) they would in
effect be shortening the sentence. They did not consider Article 71
(c) as providing either exceptions to or limitations on Article .57 (b).
Their usual response was to have prisoners begin serving any sentence
to confinement immediately after the conclusion of the court-martial.
They circumvented the clear meaning of Article 71 (c) by using the
fiction that time spent in confinement prior to the final review of the
case was not really spent serving the sentence but was merely preliminary confinement. For those whose original sentences were upheld
on appeal this practice did not result in any longer imprisonment than
they would otherwise have undergone, it only meant that the imprisonment began and ended earlier than it would have had Article
71(c) been followed. Indeed, for them the practice of disregarding
Article 71(c) resulted in a shorter total period of confinement than
would have been the case had they been kept in some -modified custody pending appeal and then required to serve the full period of
imprisonment ordered by the court-martial. For those whose sentences
to confinement were overturned on appeal, however, the practice of
bypassing Article 71 (c) was a severe deprivation.
The far-reaching Bail Reform Act of 1966 does not reach persons
convicted by courts-martial. It explicitly excludes from its protective
24
coverage any offenses which are triable by courts-martial.
The federal courts are in the midst of construing the conflicting pro122. Id. art. 71 (c), 10 U.S.C. § 871 (c)(1964).
123. Id. art. 57(b), 10 U.S.C. 5 857(b) (1964).
124. 18 US.C. § 3152(2) (Supp.lH 1966).
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visions of Articles 71(c) and 57(b) of the Code in connection with
an application for habeas corpus filed by an Air Force captain who
had been convicted by a general court-martial and sentenced to dismissal and confinement at hard labor for one year. The responsible
commanding officer who had convened the court-martial approved
the sentence and ordered that the accused, Captain Noyd, be removed to the military's disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, pending completion of review within the appellate structure
of the military justice system. This disciplinary barracks is no better
than a penitentiary as far as the inmates are concerned. The petitioner
turned to the federal courts for habeas corpus relief from the order directing his incarceration in that prison and sought either release on bail
or continuation of his pre-trial arrest in quarters at his old base. At the
district court level he won partial relief; the court agreed with his
contention that to allow his transfer to the disciplinary barracks would
be tantamount to an execution of the sentence in violation of Article
71(c).125 The district court ordered the Air Force not to transfer
the petitioner to the penitentiary-like disciplinary barracks at Fort
Leavenworth, but left it up to the Air Force to determine the conditions of restraint to be imposed pending final determination of the
petitioner's appeal. As to the request for freedom on bail pending appeal, the district court commented that the Bail Reform Act of 1966
was inapplicable. 126 The court expressed agreement with the 1967 decision of the United States Court of Military Appeals in Levy v.
Resor,'27 that the constitutional right to bail does not apply to military
personnel convicted by courts-martial, and that there was no statute
giving them any right to bail.
The court of appeals reversed on the basis that the petitioner at
the time of filing his petition had not exhausted his remedies within
military channels and that therefore the district court acted prematurely
in considering his petition. The court of appeals in deciding against
the petitioner did not comment on the merits of his contentions. 2 The
persistent petitioner next secured a temporary stay order from Justice
Douglas, 12 9 which was followed by a grant of certiorari from the
125.
1968).
126.
127.
128.
129.

Noyd v. Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968), rev'd, 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.
18 U.S.C. § 3152(2) (Supp.lH 1966).
17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968).
89 S. Ct. 478 (1968).
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Supreme Court in January; 1969.130 No final decision in the matter

had been reported as of early June 1969.
The district court in reaching its decision in Noyd v. Bond considered
the government's contention, 131 regularly used by military authorities,
that the immediate confinement of the petitioner in strict accordance with the sentence despite Article 71 (c), was required by Article
57 (b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court disagreed
with that interpretation of Articles 57(b) and 71(c) and held that
Article 71 created specific exceptions to Article 57 (b).
The 1968 Military Justice Act resolves this possible inconsistency
between Articles 57(b) and 71 by amending Article 57(b) to read:
Any period of confinement included in a sentence of court-martial
begins to run from the date the sentence is adjudged by the courtmartial, but periods during which the sentence to confinement is
suspended or deferred shall be excluded in computing the service
of the term of confinement. [Emphasis added.] 182
This sensible change of wording should at last secure to military defendents the protection which Congress intended in 1950 when it
adopted Article 71 (c).
The foregoing coverage of the statutory right to deferral of serving
a sentence has dealt only with cases falling within the protection of
Article 71(c), cases in which the sentence includes a punitive discharge or confinement for one year or more.
The 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice offered no such right
to persons who were sentenced to confinement for less than one year,
unless they were generals, admirals, or commodores. Nor does the
1968 Act give them such a right. It does amend Article 57 to repose
in designated commanding officers the discretionary power to defer
service of sentences to confinement on the petition of any accused
who is under a sentence to confinement which has not been ordered
executed. 3 This amendment to Article 57 is reinforced by an amendment to Article 71(d) which recognizes the authority of designated
officers to defer
service of sentences to confinement for terms of less
13 4
than one year.

130. 89 S. Ct. 692 (1969).

131. 285 F. Supp. 785, 787 (1968).
132. 10 U.S.C.A. § 857 (b) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
133. Id. § 857(d) (Supp. Feb. 1969).

134. Id. §871(d) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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The changes introduced by the 1968 Act do not grant complete
freedom pending appeal. The accused remains subject to military orders, and may be confined to his base or ship and even placed under
some appropriate form of restraint such as restriction to his quarters
or some designated area of a base. Captain Noyd was placed under
guard in the base bachelor officers quarters following the granting of
habeas corpus relief in Noyd v. Bond.135 Actual confinement, short of
the rigors of the actual sentence, may still be imposed pending appeal. The same types of deprivation of liberty may be imposed at the
pre-trial stages of a case, for the constitutional right to pre-trial bail
does not extend to persons appearing before military courts.
NEW TRIAL

The 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice allowed an accused
who had been convicted by court-martial to petition for a new trial
on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or of fraud on the
court. This right could only be exercised within one year of the date
of the approval of the sentence by the commanding officer who had
convened the court-martial. The right came into existence only if
the sentence extended to death, dismissal of an officer, punitive discharge of an enlisted man, or confinement for one year or more. 130
Read in conjunction with other provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, this. meant that no petitions for new trial could be
brought from convictions by summary courts since those courts have
no jurisdiction to issue any of the indicated sentences. 37 The only
convictions by special court-martial from which the accused could
petition for a new trial were those in which an enlisted man had been
sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, because special courts-martial
do not have authority to issue any of the other indicated sentences. 38
The 1968 Act extends the time for filing a petition for new trial
to two years from the date of approval of the sentence, and it allows
an accused to file such a petition regardless of the nature of the sen13 9
tence.
Persons convicted by court-martial who hope for eventual relief
from federal courts on a petition of habeas corpus must first avail them135. 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968).
136. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 73, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1964).

137. Id. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. at § 820 (1964).
138. Id. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. at § 819 (1964).
139. 10 U.S.C.A. § 873 (Supp. Feb. 1969).

1969]

THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF

1968

selves of this newly expanded right to seek new trial whether their
conviction or petition for habeas corpus comes before or after the
effective date of this section of the 1968 Act. With rare exceptions,
federal courts do not act on petitions for habeas corpus from persons
complaining of their conviction by courts-martial unless the petitioners
have exhausted all remedies within the military system including the
remedy of petitioning for a new trial. 140 This has been applied even
where no right to petition for new trial existed at the time of conviction but became available to the accused before he filed his petition
for habeas corpus.14' The leading case in this area is the Supreme

Court decision in Gusik v. Schilder. 42 The petitioner in that case had
been convicted by an Army court-martial at a time when no right to,
petition for -a new trial existed. He had exhausted all then existingremedies within the military system, and had filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the appropriate district court. Congress amended
the Army's Articles of War, however, to allow petitions for new
trials under Article 53,143 and this newly created privilege became
available to the prisoner after he had filed his petition for habeas corpus,
The United States Supreme Court held:
If Article 53 had been in force when the habeas corpus proceedings were instituted, the District Court would not have been justified in entertaining the petition unless the remedy afforded by the
article had been exhausted . . . . If an available procedure has
not been employed to rectify the alleged error which the federal
court is asked to correct, any interference by the federal court may
be wholly needless . . . . That policy is as well served whether
the remedy which is available was existent at the time resort was
had to the federal courts or was subsequently created ....

.44

The Court went on to hold that the lower federal courts should, in
a situation of a late-arising post-conviction remedy, hold a petition
for habeas corpus in abeyance until the petitioner exhausts the newly
created right, rather than deny the petition.
The 1968 Act offers still another remedy within the military justice
140. Sweeney v. Hiatt, 89 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Cochrane v. Zuppann, 89
F. Supp. 329 (M.D. Pa. 1950); Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinationsand
the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement; 55 VA. L. IEv. 483 (1969).
141. Williams v. Humphrey, 89 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
142. 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
143. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 621, 62 Stat. 604, 639.
144. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1950).
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system for persons convicted by courts-martial and later seeking redress. Article 69 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, dealing with
review in the office of the Judge Advocate General of each Service, is
amended to add a provision that:
. . . the findings or sentence, or both, in a court-martial case
which has been finally reviewed, but has not been reviewed by a
Court of Military Review may be vacated or modified, in whole
or in part, by the Judge Advocate General on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdiction over
the accused or the offense, or error prejudicial to the substantial
145
rights of the accused.
No time limit is set for relief under this new provision. Presumably a
defendant seeking habeas corpus relief in a federal district court would
be required first to exhaust this new remedy.
ESTABLISHMENT OF COURTS OF MILITARY REVIEW

Of the several changes which the 1968 Act provides, those of probably least interest to the accused involve a slight reorganization in the
appellate system.
The 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice established the United
States Court of Military Appeals to review convictions by courts-martial either on a prescribed appeal basis or on a type of certiorari. 1 6
A great amount of good law has come from that court, and it has had
a tremendous liberalizing effect on the entire system of military justice.
The independence of the members of the court no doubt contributed
to that court's pioneering decisions. Its members hold fifteen-year terms,
are appointed by the President with approval of the Senate, and can
not serve on active duty in any branch of the armed forces. 47 The 1968
Act does not affect this court in any way.
The 1968 Act calls for the establishment of at least one court of
military review for each of the three military services by amending
Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'4 8 Here, however,
there is no pioneering comparable to the establishment of the Court of
Military Appeals in 1950. Rather we see a splicing together of what
145.
146.
147.
148.

10 U.S.C.A. § 869 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67(a), (b), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)-(b) (1964).
Id. art. 67 (a), 10 U.S.C. § 867 (a).
10 U.S.CA. § 866(a) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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had been the boards of review within the offices of the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Now the name is
changed from "board of review" to "panel," and each court of military
review is to consist of one or more such panels. The new courts may
sit either en banc or, as before, as separate panels. Article 68 is amended
to allow the establishment of such courts of military review in military
headquarters below the Pentagon level. 149
Unlike members of the Court of Military Appeals, the members of
these courts of military review have no real freedom of action. They
remain as they were before the 1968 change of name, either active duty
officers or civilian employees, assigned to duty on the court by the
Judge Advocate General and removable at his pleasure. 150 The only
independence given them by the 1968 Act is from each other; the Act
forbids them to prepare efficiency reports or similar documents on each
other.15' The appellate jurisdiction of the new courts of military review
is the same as that of their precursors, the boards of review.
The new courts of military review will probably continue along the
lines of the old boards of review. The 1968 Act gives no basis for expecting any significant change in their activities or outlook.
CoNCLUSION

The Military Justice Act of 1968 is the first important legislation
in its area since the passage of the sweeping Uniform Code of Military
Justice in 1950. The 1950 Code laid down a truly revolutionary basis
of protection of the rights of servicemen involved in difficulties with
military law. The 1968 Act builds upon the basic 1950 Code in several
ways. Some of the provisions of the 1968 Act are completely original
while others are little more than a codification of principles already observed, either in accordance with court decisions or because of policy
decisions within the military system. The general tenor of the 1968 Act
is toward bringing military judicial practice even closer into line with
the practice in civilian courts, while still not according the full protection of the Constitution automatically in all areas of military law.
The new Act does not make any changes for the worse; it makes
many improvements, especially in significantly extending the right to
a lawyer as defense counsel, and in greatly increasing the role and
authority of the legally trained military judges. Two serious shortcom149. Id. § 868 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
150. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66, 10 U.S.CA. § 866 (1964).
151. 10 U.S.CA. § 866(g) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
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ings of a basic constitutional nature were touched by the Act but remain to be remedied: the complete lack of the right to confrontation
of hostile witnesses at trial, and the lack of an absolute right to a lawyer
as defense counsel when being tried for a serious offense by a special
court-martial. Both of these rights could have been provided by the
1968 Act with a minimum of inconvenience to those charged with the
enforcement of the military laws.
The 1968 Act, like the basic 1950 Code, does nothing toward extending the right to trial by jury to the military justice system. Nor have
the courts questioned the propriety of trials by courts-martial without
juries. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how a true jury system could be
injected into the military justice system. The Supreme Court in the
O'Callahan decision' 52 has made an excellent start toward extending
the right to trial by jury to servicemen by depriving courts-martial
of jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemen in many areas
and thus granting civilian courts, presumably with juries for all but
misdemeanors, exclusive juirsdiction in these areas. Hopefully Congress,
the military authorities themselves, or court action will completely
end the peacetime encroachment of the military authorities into the
judicial process and return jurisdiction to what it was prior to World
War I, that is, to no court-martial jurisdiction over non-military offenses committed within the United States. A further step, which
would be a major innovation, would be to transfer peacetime jurisdiction over serious non-military offenses committed abroad by servicemen from the military justice system to appropriate federal or state
,courts for trial by jury within the United States, for example, by ending general court-martial jurisdiction over all non-military offenses committed abroad during time of peace. As to offenses of a non-military
nature committed within the United States during peacetime, these
changes should restore to servicemen protection of the law equal to
that of civilian offenders, a right to which they are entitled and which
servicemen enjoyed prior to World War I. As to serious non-military
offenses committed abroad during peacetime the changes would not
provide treatment equal to that of American civilians, who in many
instances cannot be tried by American courts, but a jury trial would
be preferable to a general court-martial. Concurrent jurisdiction,
shared with the courts of the foreign country in Which the offense was
committed, would continue where it presently exists under status of
152. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969).
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forces agreements or otherwise, and special and summary courts-martial would continue to deal with minor offenses committed abroad. The
changes would leave unimpaired court-martial jurisdiction over militarytype offenses wherever and whenever committed, over serious nonmilitary offenses committed abroad during wartime, and over minor
non-military offenses committed abroad.
Due process for servicemen has become more developed and refined
and the Military Justice Act of 1968 is a significant milestone in its
progress, but ever-narrowing areas of unfair, perhaps even unconstitutional, practice remain for future remedial action.

